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The key short-term measures for reform of the labor market in
Czechoslovakia are wage indexation, deregulation of the wage
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Rix'eros discusses the short-term and long-termn  Unemployment will be a feature of the
labor market policies Czechoslovakia needs for  economy for structural reasons and 'hecause  ol
the economic reforn  envisaged in the current  short-termi  mismatches of skills anis the normal
economic program.  The policy implications of  fallout from the econmic cycle.  A scheme
his analysis can be extended to other Easteni  iniegratinig  government subsidies and an insur-
European countries.  ance system witli participation of both employce
and employer could be developed initially.
Riveros  emphasizes  that wage  indexation,
deregulatioIn  of tleC  walge structure,  and  flacilita-  *  The wage  indexation  system  is adequate  to
lioIn  of labor mobility are key short-terin mea-  drive down inflationary expectations and to
suIes.  Thcy  incIrease the prospects  for success  stimllulaite  cmployment adjustmenits.  But tlhee
not onl-y of structural  reform  but of other miacro-  will be practical  problems  enforcing  the  wage
economic policies aimed at conitrollinig  inflation.  policy.
In tlhe  long temi, reforming labor niarket  *  A 'equate mechanisms must be established
institutions-  especially  tliose responsible  for  lbr mAinaging  lhe  miniimiuI  walge. The  piice
setting wages and unemployment compensation  must be used as a signiazl  of economic develop-
plans - must take priority, to ensure that the  meinis  and of the basic price lor unskilled labor
labor market functions in harmnony  with the  - and not as an instrumilent  of income distribu-
overall market environment.  tion.
Riveros furilter conclu(des  that:  *  As for labor mobility, breaking the link
betweei providing benetits and(  jobs is funidal-
Uniemploymcnit will n0ot  causC significant  ;mncitatl  to Censur  ilng more rapid  ad(jUstIIellt  in job
fiscal strain if dismissals of retired employees  opportunities and encour-aiging  lhe supply
are  made a pnioity,  but thcic will be moie openl  response.
unemploymncti  Ihalt the  govcrnmiienit  expects.
Thc l'RE Working Paper  Scries  disseminates  the  n(linigs of work tindcr Aay in Lhe  Bank's  Policy, Research,  and External
Affairs Comp)lexx.  An ol)jective of tlh series ic to get lIese findings out quickly, evecn  if  prcsentations aiel  css tian fully 1 vlXislied.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions in these papers do not neccssarily represent olrficijal  Baunk  policy.
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Czechoslovakia  (CSFR)  faces  marked  challenges  for  successfully  accomplishing
its transition to a market economy. In recent years the economy  was characterized  by a
good deal of internal and external equilibrium, making possible the  current market-
oriented reforms without the  complications  which arise from a  complex stabilization
program.  However, the present administration  is contending both with the distorted
allocation  of resources  and a rigid  regulatory  framework  left by the old system;  these have
created potential impediments  to the success of reform measures.  Improving  CSFR's
investment  and growth  record through  better use of productive  factors primarily  requires
price and trade liberalization,  privatization,  and closure  of inefficient  activities. But these
policies necessitate  a highly  stringent program whose  short term repercussions  would be
aggravated  still further by the depressed international  economy  and a negative  terms of
trade shock arising from both the oil crisis and the breakdown of the CMEA trade
agreement.
Labor market reforms  in both the short and long term represcnt a dramatic
change  from the past,and a key challenge  for designing  programs  and attaining political
sustainability.  The labor market policies  traditionally  followed  in CSFR are an important
4ource of market rigidities, inhibiting  a rapid supply response to the reform program.
While labor allocation  in the past was determined  according  to non-economic  criteria, and
the centralized  wage management  favored equity to efficiency  targets, substantial inter-
industry  labor mobility  and real wage flexibility  stand out as necessary  pre-conditions  for
successful  restructuring  of the productive  sector. During the transition,  the contrast with
the past will be pronounced,  especially  with the introduction  of open unemployment  and
a decline in real wages,  making the political  aspect of adjustment  important.
In the short run, proper  labor market  policies  play a central  role in preventing
an inflationary  spiral. Price liberalization  was instituted  in January 1991. The economic
program  set the exchange  rate and the wage  rate as nominal  anchors  for domestic  prices,
implying  that they will be adjusted for inflation.  However,  if traditional price setting
practices are continued  while large state monopolies  are maintained,  wage increases  will
be  readily translated into prices.  Hence, introducing  wage restraint by means of an
indexation scheme and tight fiscal management is necessary  to  contain any potential
inflationary  pressure. Given  that an indexation  system  designed  to curb inflation  will  trigger
a drop in real wages,  it is almost  as important  that it be politically  acceptable  as that it be
appropriately  designed  from a technical  point of view. In particular,  a too restrictive  wage
indexation  system  runs the risk of being effective  only  at the beginning  of the program,  but
politically  unsustainable  as the program  advances.  Most  likely,  the effectiveness  of the wage
indexation  policy  will  be key to the effectiveness  of the macroeconomic  adjustment  program
between 1991  and 1992.
In the longer term, CSFR, alike all other Eastern European countries in
economic  transition,  faces  the challenge  of designing  an appropriate  institutional  framework
for the labor market.  Unemployment  will be a normal  byproduct  of market allocation  as
persons flow between jobs, necessitating  an unemployment  insurance system along with2
policies and institutions aimed at easing the friction incurred with intersectoral labor
mobility. Similarly,  wage  setting  mechanisms  must  be instituted,  possibly  through  collective
bargaining. These would be more compatible  with the way  a market economy  functions,
and include limited state intervention. The new system  will also require a new union
movement  and new regulations  on job security  and non-wage  compensations.
During the transition period, crucial labor market policies to be adopted
include: (a) Adoption  of suitable  wage indexation  norms  using  wages  as a nominal  anchor
while the wage structure is deregulated to reflect lrbor productivity;  (b) Facilitation of
labor dismissal  and encouragement  of labor mobility;  and (c) Implementation  of a social
safety  net to assist  the unemployed. In the medium  to longer  term the basic reforms  to be
pursued  are: (a) Creation of a wage setting  mechanism  based on employer  bargaining;  (b)
Establishment  of an unemployment  insurance  system  and other institutions  needed in a
market economy;  (c) Design  of an appropriate system  for monitoring  the labor market.
This paper is written in four sections.  After this introduction, Section 2
describes  the present economic  situation and the policies  adopted to date with respect to
employmnent,  unemployment  and wages. Section  3 analyzes  the implications  and problems
associated  with these policies  and presents  alternative  unewiloyment  scenarios. Section  4
offers conclusions  and elaborates policy  implications.
AL LABOR MARKET  CONDMTIONS  AND RECENT POUCIES
A.  Labor Forc  and  Employment
CSFR is characterized  by relatively  low population  growth and high labor
force participation  (LFP). Over the period 1970-1990  the population  grew at a rate of 0.4
percent per annum (p.a.), a rate that dropped to  0.2 percent p.a. during 1985-90. The
working  age population  (WAP) grew at a similar rate (0.4 percent) during these periods.
This  change  in the age structure  in turn suggests  the absence  of important  supply  pressures. 1
In general, the LFP is relatively  high (Table 1A, Appendix),  reaching on average 86.9
percent in 1981-882.  In contrast, in 1981  and 1980  this rate reached  55.8  and 72.5  percent
in, respectively,  Hungary  and Yugoslavia.  In the Western European countries  of Austria,
the former West Germany,  France, and Spain,  the LFP was respectively  65.9%,  67.2%,
1  Figures on flow of entrants into and leavers from the labor force also indicate a relatively  static labor
market.  In 1985-1987  the net additions to the labor force were 03%  p.a., while this same indicator declined
to 0.1% in 1987-1989.
2  According  to the International Labor Office (ILO), in 1980  the LFP in CSFR reached 78.9%. IL  defines
working age population as those between 15 and 65 years.  CSFR's statistical sources define working age
population as those between 15 and 60 years for males, and 15 and 55 years for females.  Therein lies the
difference  between ILO results and those reported here.3
65.8%  and 54.7%.3  The;  female  LFP is also relatively  high;  at present it is greater than that
of the other European countries.
In addition to sustaining  this high level the LFP continued to grow during
the 1980s. This was not due to an increase in the WAP as indicated by the relative
constant ratio of the WAP to the total population  (Table 2A, Appendix),  but rather to an
increase  in secondary  labor force  participation  (i.e., women,  youth,  and workers  eligible  for
retirement).  This observation is consistent with the higb, and yet increasing,  female
participation  rate, the drop in the rate of school  attendance,  and the increasing  number of
retired people actually  holding  jobs (Table 1A,  Appendix).
Official  figures  indicate  small  rates of growth  in aggregate  employment  at 0.6
percent p.a. during 1970-90,  and a small  drop in 1989-90  (Table IA, Appendix). Corrected
employment  figures  (Table 2A, Appendix)  indicate that employment  grew at even lower
rates (0.5 percent  p.a. in 1981-88),  and even  declined  by 1.4  percent during  1988-90.  During
the period 1970-88,  the real growth  of the net material  output reached about 2 percent p.a.,
further declining to 0.7 percent and -3.5 percent respectively  in 1989 and 1990.  This
suggests  a relatively  small aggregate  employment-output  elasticity,  which reached a value
of only 0.25 in 1981-1988S.
The composition  of civilian  employment  across industrial  sectors (Table 5A,
Appendix)  was fundamentally  static from 1981-19896.  Tbe only important change during
this period was the chronic decline in employment  in the agricultural  sector at a rate of
about 0.7 percent p.a.; this period was  concurrent  with growth  of agricultural  output at 1.9
percent p.a.. In contrast, during that same period, employment  in the total non-material
sphere grew at 0.9  percent p.a. while in the service  sector  it grew 13 percent p.a. between
1981  and 1988. While employment  grew at 0.7 and 0.4 percent p.a. respectively  in the
industrial 7 and construction  sectors,  the employment-output  elasticity  of  the former  indicated
by official  figures  is as low as 0.1, while  it reaches  0.4 in the latter case. During the 1980s,
employment dropped  in  the  aggregate tradeables sector; employment growth was
concentrated  in non-tradeable  activities,  particularly  those more directly linked with the
central Government  (Table 1).
3 Data taken  from the ILO Yearbook,  1987.  The years  for the countries  mentioned  are respectively  1986,
1985,  1986  and 1981.
4  Official  employment  estimates  (Table  1), exdude  women  on maternity  leave,  trainees,  armed  forces  and
other  groups  considered  working  in high  security  fields,  such  as  workers  in uranium  mining  and those employed
by the Communist  Party.  These  estimates  did not correct  for those  persons  holding  two  or more  part-time  jobs.
S Econometric  estimates,  which  have  accounted  for the role  of both wages  and output  in explaining  observed
employment  changes, indicate a  similar, small, long run employment-output  elasticity  of 027. Similar
phenomenon  is observed  in other former  socialist  countries.  (See Riveros,  1990).
6  The civilian  employment  figures  exclude  military  personnel.
7 The definition  of industry  used here is broad,  in order to match  statistics  )n net material  product;  thus,
it includes  mining,  manufacturing  and utilities.4
Table 1
Czechoslovakia:  Aggregate  Employment  Trends
1981  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
TradeableQ  100.0  100.2  100.4  100.4  100.3  994
-Manufacturing  100.0  100.7  101.2  101.6  101.7  101.5
Non-Tradeable  100.0  103.5  104.7  105.4  106.6  107.4
-Services  Ab  100.0  103.2  104.1  104.5  105.G  105.8
-Services  BC  100.0  105.4  106.7  107.7  109.9  111.4
a/  Includes  Agriculture,  Minig and Manufacturing.
b/  Includes  wholesale  and retail  trade; restaurants  and hotels;  transport,  storage
and communications;  financing,  insurance, real estate and business services.
c/  Includes  community,  social  and personal  services.
B.  Wages  and Productivity
Small  industry  and skill  wage  differentials  characterize  CSFR's labor market.
These  are fundamentally  the result of distributionist  policies  systematically  pursued  through
active state intervention. The lowest  paying industry,  commerce,  has an average wage
which  is 83 percent that of the average  wage  for the economy  (Table 8A,  Appendix) 8. The
highest  paid industry,  mining,  is characterized  by wages  47 percent higher than the average.
The total differential  across  industries  is about 1.8. In terms of skills  (Table 8A,  Appendix),
the lowest  paid, a worker with primary  education  in the health sector, receives  one third
as much as the average  wage of the highest  paid, a worker  with higher  education  working
in mining.
To  a  large  extent, the  reason  inter-firm and  inter-occupational  wage
differentials  are small  is because traditional  wage  controls  were implemented  through  the
so-called  tariff-wage  system. By  establishing  a base hourly  wage  for 12  different  skill  groups
in 9 economic  sedors, the tariff wage system sets and regulates wages for about one
hundred jobs.  Naturally,  the underlying  purpose of such a system was to regulate the
income  distribution  resulting  from productive  activities,  without  consideration  of individual
worker productivity. Under the current system,  the highest  paid group is assigned  wages
twice  that of the lowest  paid group within  a specific  economic  sector, and wages  differ by
a factor of 2.5 between the lowest  and the highest  wage sectors  for a given skill level.
8 See further  Kux,  (1988).5
The average real wage for the aggregate  public sector grew 1.5 percent in
1970-89  (see Table 6A, Appendix).  The real wage  grew 2.2 percent p.a. between 1970-80.
But growth slowed down significantly  to 0.9 percent p.a. between 1980-89. During the
1970s  and most of the 1980s,  price :,iflation  was recorded  below 1 percent p.a., but in 1989,
inflation escalated to 2.3 pe-cent p.a.  Moreover,  in 1989-90  the real wage dropped by 3
percent, reaching almost  4 ipercent  in the material sphere;  inflation  reached 10.9  percent
during 1990. Similar wage fluctuations  are observed  across all sectors; the agricultural
sector  underwent  the largest  real wage  increase  between  1970-89,  and it was  the only  sector
in which  real wages  did not drop in 1989-90.  The non-material  sphere experienced  a lower
increase during 1970-89,  but it also suffered  a smaller decline  in 1989-90.
Among industries,  relative wages  clearly  show a trend towards  equalization
in the material sector (see Table 7A, Appendix);  this has taken place primarily  because of
a relative increase in agricultural  wages. The erosion of inter-industry  wage  differentials
observed  originally  in 1970  has been notable,  declining  from a maximum  of 20 percent in
1970  to approximately  6 percent in 1990. Moreover,  compressing  wage  differentials  in the
material sphere have resulted  in lower  relative  wages  for the non-material  sphere;  relative
wages  between material and non-material  spheres dropped significantly  between 1970  and
1985.
Given the existence  of a 50 percent payroll  tax, the total cost of labor from
the viewpoint  of the employer  amounts  to 1.5  times the level of total wages. This includes
bonuses,  premiums,  and overtime  payments  amounting  to about 20 percent of basic  wages.
Therefore, it does not include family  allowances  and other health-related  state subsidies.
The average hourly  labor cost for the manufacturing  employer  is about Kcs 28 or about
US$  1.1,  using the prevailing  commercial  exchange  rate; this is still lower than the labor
costs in market economies 9. From the employee's  point of view,  there is in effect a wage
tax amounting on average to 17 percent of total wages. This would be changed in the
future to a tax system  based upon declared income.
C.  Policies  Adopted for the Inar  sition
1.  Emploentand  U1nemploMent
The government  has adopted policies  to avert likely pressure arising from
increases  in the labor supply. Vacation  periods and maternity  leaves  will  be extended,  and
women  will be allowed  to work part-time. In addition,  the government  plans to proscribe
employment  of retired  persons. Nonetheless,  the most  fundamental  pressure  on the market
in the short term will arise from the labor spillover  between contracting  and expanding
economic  activities.  This spillover  will  necessitate  emphasis  on policies  oriented to fostering
efficient  labor mobility. For this purpose, the government  has implemented  an
9  The hourly  compensation  cost of manufacturing  in 1989  amounted  to, respectively:  USS  13.6;  9.1; 12.7
and 17.6  in Austria, Spain,  France and Germany. In the USA,  this figure  reached USS 143, and in Hong
Kong,Singapore,  Korea and Taiwan,  this figure  reached  respectively  US$  2.8; 3.1;  3.6 and 3.5. (Source:  BLS,
US. Department  of Labor:  Intemadionl  Comoarisons  of Hourl Comnnation Coss6
unemployment  compensation  scheme which will operate through labor exchange offices
and include training activities and adequate incentives for starting an efficient job searchlo.
Actions have also been taken to diminish the social impact of the labor
adjustment that must take place in 1991-92  while market efficiency  is improving. A
severance payment plan has been set in place which stipulates that a laid-off  worker will
receive three months' notice and the equivalent  of two months' wages.  Recently, the
government  decided to authorize  firms to pay this amount for five months as a luinp-sum
severance  compensation  packet,  and dismiss  the worker  immediately.  In order to stimulate
labor absorption through evxpanding  activities,  a 1990  provision  has been abolished  which
required the hiring  firm to pay the wage  differential  between the old and the new job.
In the short run, one of the most important problems  that CSFR will face
is growing  unemployment. This is a new phenomenon,  with broad political and social
implications. The creation of a social saiety net for the unemployed  primarily requires
adequate budgetary provisions  to finance payment of unemployment  compensation  and
well functioning  employment/training  services. In what is considered  a likely  scenario,  the
government  estimates  that open unemployment  may reach 4 percent of the labor force in
199111  (see Table 2).  Depending upon the extent of industrial restructuring and the
elimination  of excess  employment,  the rate of open unemployment  may  reach substantially
higher levels.  For  instance, in  its  high scenario, the  Government estimates an
unemployment  rate of 11 percent.
2.  ags
Through the General Agreement  with the trade unions,  the Government  has
introduced  a mechanism  for adjusting  nominal wages  for inflation. This mechanism  will
allow  for a 12  percent real decline  of the wage  bill in the economy  during  1991,  continuing
the trend downward  of the real wage from the 1990  decline of about 3 percent.  The
indexation mechanism will permit quarterly adjustmernts  in the  nominal wage bill of
enterprises by looking at past inflation rates.  In March 1991, the amount of growth
permitted in the nominal  wage  bill was to be 5 percent for the non-government  sector and
6 percent for the government  sector; in the latter case is claimed that real wages have
lagged  behind in recent years. In successive  quarters during 1991, the nominal  wage bill
will be adjusted by measuring the accumulated inflation since December 1990.  For
purposes of implementing  this mechanism, the concept of wages is a broad one, and
includes  all labor payments  normally  paid out of total expenses  in the form of bonuses and
benefits.
Enterprises  may  increase  the nominal  wage  bill by a percentage  greater than
that stipulated  if the additional  wage  increase  can be financed  out of profits. However,  if
10 The  characteristics  and operation  of these  programs  are discussed  in Holzman  (1991),  Thompson  (1991),
and  Pascoe  (1991).
11 As of January  1990,  there were about  80 thousand  registered  unemployed,  which  is roughly  1 percent
of the labor force.7
the firm exceeds  the permitted increase in the wage bill by more than 3 percent, a tax of
200 percent will be levied  on the difference. This tax will increase  to 750 percent if firms
exceed the permitted increase in the wage  bill by more than 5 percent.
Table 2
CSFR Government:  Unemployment  Estimates
(00XS)
MO  ceado  La  Scenario  Likew  Sceari
(A)  Empmn  fnractim:
State Initiated
Structural Reformsa  -158  -64  -158
Organizational  Changesb  -36  -25  -36
Elimination  of Overemployment  -700  -350  -350
Recessionary  Impact  -700  400  400
(B)  E  nnt  E-ansion:
Development  of Travel  100  150  100
Financial  Sector Development  12  26  19
Creation of New Organismec  15  25  15
Private Enterprise Development  465  625  485
Unemploment [A-B]Y  1,017  38  340
AO  (12.0)  (0.5)  (4.0)
a/  Conversion  of the arms industry-,  slowdown  of ore, coal  and uranium  mining;  slowdown  of metallurgical
industry.
b/  Administrative  reforms.
c/  Establishment  of labor  exchanges,  revenue  bureaus,  trade bureaus.
d/  Unemployment  rate (number  of unemployed  divided  by the labor  force,  which  for 1990  is equal to the
total corrected  employment).  For 1992,  the absolute  size  of the labor  force  was  not increased  for
the calculations.
IE  POUCY ANALYSIS
A.  Maoeconomic Framework
The economic  program  for 1991  considers  almost  complete  liberalization  of
wholesale and retail prices, along with the unification  and liberalization  of the exchange
rate.  The trade system  will continue to be liberalized;  export and import licensing  have
already  been almost  completely  eliminated. Continuing  these  policies  will  imply  substantial
change  in relative prices and, in the medium term, better allocation of resources. In the8
short run, following  the collapse  of the CMEA  trade agreement and the effect of the oil
crisis,  these changes  will  be accompanied  by a substantial  drop in the terms of trade. The
1991  economic  program  entails tight fiscal  management  which aims  to consolidate  surplus
at  1 percent of GDP.  With respect to credit policy, the economic  progran  for 1991
includes a target rate of growth in liquidity  of 5.5 percent, which should be achieved
concurrently  with  an interest rate system  which  reflects  the social  opportunity  cost  of capital.
The short run recessionary  impact  of the program,  especially  associated  with the higher  cost
of imports,  will result in an estimated  drop in 1991  GDP of between  5 and 10 percent.
All of these adjustment  and demand management  policies will take effect
while important structural transformations are  implemented. Privatization of  small
businesses  began  in 1991,  and privatization  of large state enterprises  will  start by late 1991.
The latter wil1  be accomplished  by transforming  the enterprises  into corporate entities;  a
proportion of their shares will be sold to foreign  and domestic  investors,  while the rest of
these shares will be distributed  among the population through  a voucher system. 12
B.  Labor  QbiSQl
The high IFP observed  in CSFR may be attributed to the virtual obligation
to work because  of prevailing  low  wages  combined  with many  non-wage  benefits  which  had
been used in the past to promote employment. Given the high participation  rates of the
secondary  labor force, it is unlikely that the economy  will face major additional labor
supply  pressures  steim.ming  from the response  of family  groups  to adjustment  policies  and
to worsening  economic  conditions  in 1991-92.  Therefore,  most of the policies  adopted to
date to prevent labor supply  problems  are not strictly  necessary  and, to some extent, may
be undesirable,  as in the case of one policy  to increase  certain subsidies  in order to prevent
the active  participation  in the labor market. In particular,  attempts  to prohibit  employment
of retired persons can be detrimental to flrms in which  they are in high demand due to
their specific  skills. It would be more advisable  to institute a policy  aimed at increasing
their relative cost to the enterprises, while introducing  a  higher tax rate on incomes
obtained above pension payments.
Attaining an adequate supply response requires encouragement  of inter-
industr' and geographical  labor mobiiity. In this context,  measures are necessary  which
aim to erase social benefits  from job contracts  in order to ease short run labor mobility.
This is particularly  important in the case of housing  since in many cases, houses are
provided  by the firms as part of the job contract;  thus, dismissal  of a worker also conveys
his  iction. Similarly,  firms  commonly  provide  some free-of-charge  social  services  to their
employees  such as health and education. These benefits  are normal!y  considered  part of
total labor income.  They may  be crucial  factors for retarding  the employment  adjustment
that must take place both due to the r.- essionary  impact of the 1991  economic  program
and to the beginning  of industrial restructuring. They may also prompt labor hoarding
practices. This situation calls  for measures  aimed at solving  the implicit  property  problem
12 In February  1991,  the Parliament  approved  the law  required  to proceed  with  an extensive  privatization
of state firms  by selLing  them to foreign  or domestic  investors,  or returning  them  to their previous  owners.9
and, over the medium run, at developing  a housing  market. It also calls for privatization
and transference  to local governments  of the health and education  services  now provided
by firms. Policies  in these areas would  contribute  to diminishiing  the negative  social  impact
of these benefits through better targeting of the more needy population and improved
program  efficiency.
C. 
In a system  in which  wages  reflect labor productivity,  it is normal to observe
larger inter-occupational  and inter-industrial  wage differentials  than those seen under a
regulatory  scheme. Achieving  larger  wage differentials  derived from differences  in labor
productivity  is important  for both encouraging  better labor allocation  and providing  a signal
of the most productive  sectors and jobs in the economy,  which is in turn important  with
regard to investment. These larger differentials  would naturally result if measures were
implemented  which  were aimed at fully  liberalizing  the wage  setting  process.  This however
is infeasible  in the short run given the risk of entering  an inflationary  spiral. Nonetheless,
even  within  the context  of a system  permitting  wage  increases,  enterprises  should  be allowed
to effect different adjustments  according  to productivity  differentials,  in order to begin
allocation  of reszurces  in a more efficient  manner. This may be achieved  through  current
provisions  which  allow  for wage  increases  out of profits  if no other regulation  forces  a more
compressed  wage structure.
While  the wage  policy  should  aim at obtaining  higher  wage  differentials,  the
short run regulations  on wage  adjustment  have  been framed  in the context  of the traditional
tariff-wage  system. Therefore, firms are not free to provide different wage increases  to
different labor groups within the firm if these changes do not comply  with the wage
differentials  implicit  in the regulated  tariff wages. Even if certain categories  of labor are
dismissed,  normally  freeing up resources  which  could then be used to increase the wages
of  remaining  workers,  the firm must preserve  regulated  wage  differentials. In a period of
strong  competitive  pressure,  this system  impairs  the firm from improving  its supply  respGnse
by tying  wages  more closely  to productivity.  This system  also impedes  free pricing  of labor
and, in the end, a more efficient  labor market.
The  tariff  wage  system  must  also  be  eliminated  if  unnecessarily  high
unemployment  is to be avoided. Current  wage  regulations  impede  the firm  from proceeding
with  internal reallocation  of labor and subsequent  wage  adjustment. For instance,  workers
cannot be downgraded  or  assigned  to different responsibilities  which imply lower pay.
These steps might be necessary  in a period of both shifts in relative prices and technical
change. Because  of this system's  inflexibility,  the firm must resort to dismissing  its labor
and then hiring  new  workers  from outside  the firm to shift labor, an operation  which  would
otherwise  be economically  costless. Also,  higher  private  and social  costs  result,  which  could
be eliminated  by introducing  fundamental  change  in the regulatory  structure.
Privatization  and wage  deregulation  should  be joint policies:  firms  which  are
privatized  should not be subject to wage regulation.  In fact, the CSFR government  has
declared  it will follow this principle.  In the short  termi, liberalization of private sector
wages  is  imperative  for attracting  foreign  investment  and for implementing  the privatization10
program. Implementing  a policy  of private sector  deregulation  of wage controls  is also an
important  element  for founding  a legal framework  for the labor market,  which should  aim
to  minimize the degree to which the Government intervenes in setting wages.  The
liberalization  of wages  in the private sector might  be considered  a risk from the viewpoint
of aggregate  demand  expansion  and inflation. However,  given  the actual small  scale of the
private sector and the fact that large scale privatization  will  start only  by the end of 1991,
this risk is minimal compared with the advantage of providing  incentives  to support the
privatization  effort.
Management  of the recently created minimum  wage must reflect reduced
Govermment  intervention. The niinimum  wage  must be managed  conservatively  so that it
might signal  the base price for unskilled  labor, important  later as key information  in the
collective  bargaining  process. The minimum  wage should be maintained as a signal  of
general economic  conditions,  and not as a tool for achieving  any equity goals. The social
impact resulting  from low wage  levels  can be addressed  through  various means, such  as by
establishing  a minimum  income  level  with  Government  subsidies,  a tool much  more  efficient
for targetir. and protecting  the poor. At the same time,  the monetary  level and coverage
of the minimum  wage should be reviewed  carefully,  including  its applicability  to special
situations - i.e., part-time workers and trainees, - its negative effect on the employment
of unsldkled  labor,  and its probable major role in pushing  up overall  wages and prices.
D.  Wg  Indexation
A basic  prerequisite  of an efficient  wage  indexation  system  has been included
in the precepts recently  approved  by the Government. Sufficient  time is allotted between
successive wage adjustments to  curb popular inflationary expectations.  The  wage
adjustment  procedure will take place quarterly. If accumulated  inflation  is greater than
10 percent but less than 35 percent, the nominal  wage bill will be adjusted  by 60 percent
of the measured price increase. If accumulated  inflation  is greater than 35 percent, the
wage bill in successive  quarters can be adjusted  by adding 80 percent of the amount by
which  actual inflation  exceeds  35 percent. The targeted drop in real wages  during 1991  is
about 12 percent
The  political sustainability of  the  indexation mechanism envisaged is
guaranteed  because the expected  decline in the real wage during 1991  will not be great
enough to elicit social  unrest; ift as expected,  inflation  reaches 35 percent, real wages  will
decline  by about 14  percent. This latter percentage  will  slowly  increase  with higher  rates of
inflation. As the recent experience  in Poland demonstrate,  a system based on monthly
wage adjustments  is prominent  to full infiationary  expectations.  In this country,  given that
inflation was likely higher than expected, the  negative effect on real wages became
politically  and socially  unsustainable.  3
13  However,  the Polish  wage  indexation  system  was  not binding  during  the first  part of 1990,  possibly  due
to rising  unemployment.  During  the second  part of the year,  the indexation  scheme  became  binding  as workers
attempted  to recover  real wages  which  had declined  by half. See,  Coricelli,  Fabrizio  and Revenga  (1991).11
An important problem implicit in the recently approved provisions regarding
wage indexation concerns the  unit of reference for adjustment purposes.  The General
Agreement asserts that the average nominal wage will be the unit which should be adjusted.
As stated above, the  Ministry of Labor had asserted that the wage bill will be the unit to
be adjusted, given that  this is the  only form by which the  measure can  be adequately
enforced.  The problem with the former reference unit is in defining the average wage in
a  practical  way so  that  the  adjustment  process  can  be  implemented.  The  relevant
measurement of employment to be used may create enforcement problems, especially in
periods when workers are being dismissed.  In addition, in an economy characterized by
substantial non-wage payments, defining what should be included as wages may also be
highly controversial.
By focusing on  the  wage bill rather  than  on  average wages, firms have
incentive to accelerate labor dismissals  to increase the wages per worker, thereby ensuring
more rapid employment adjustment:  If t is the tax rate and p  is the permitted percentage
increase of the wage bill (wL), then the tax per worker (TL  .3.
t /wL  - (w., L,)  (1 +p )]
where (w%.  L.,)  (I +p)  is the permitted growth in the wage bill.
Relative to the past period's wage bill (w-, L-,) the tax per worker is:
TL
- L  (  ^  -" ---------  = t (Wv  + L  -p  )
w,  L,
where w and L are the growth rate of wages and employment respectively.
Therefore, this sytem taxes the employment growth (L), providing incentives to the
reduce job places (Layard, 1990), during the first phase of the adjustment this may be a
desirable outcome to allow elimination of overemployment. If the tax is on the wage rate
(or the average wage) the formula for the tax per worker is:
TL  = t [w - (w.,)  (1 +p)],
which corresponds to:
TL
----- = t (w-p)
w-1
implying that the employment level is not directly affected by the taxation mechanism.
Allowing enterprises to determine worker premiums for productivity is both
sensible and important for facilitating labor allocation.  But one problem lies in measuring
profits on  a quarterly  basis in  a suitable and  practical form.  As discussed above, the12
payment of a productivity premium based on profit may be an important mechanism for
providing labor compensation under a more deregulated wage structure. However, it could
be misused by large monopolies as justification for increasing prices in order to increase
profits, which would present serious problems for the anti-inflation program; this situation
would demand significant monitoring on the part of the enforcing authority.
Another serious problem associated with the wage indexation scheme is with
respect  to  the  minimum wage.  As previously stated,  in February  1991 the  Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs estimated that about 8 percent of the labor force earned less than
the minimum wage level of Kcs 2,000 established in the General  Agreement.  Given that
the minimum wage is fully indexed for inflation greater  than 5 percent while the average
wage will only be partly indexed, progressively  more workers will be earning the minimum
wage.  Therefore,  firms will have to  allocate additional  resources  in  order  to  pay the
corresponding wage increases to workers covered by the  law.  This  situation would be
particularly true in an economy like that of CSFR since it is characterized by a relatively
compressed wage structure. During a period of  financial difficulty, this requirement may
impose a serious burden  on firms and be detrimental to their most productive labor.  In
addition, due to prevailing extreme wage compression with the structure of relative wages,
serious problems will arise in any given quarter whose severity will be dependent upon the
inflation rate.
E.  Unemployment consequences
Unemployment estimates are important in two fundamental respects. First,
they are  necessary for  adequately  assessing the  fiscal cost  associated  with  providing
monetary compensation and employment services to the unemployed.  Second, they force
political realism into an evaluation of the short run impact of reforms.  A serious under-
estimate not only implies that fiscal provisions will be insufficient, but also signals that the
government's expectations will be out of line with the actual dimension of the adjustment
and its social cost.
Three  fundamental factors have to be taken into account in the estimates.
These are: (a) elimination of existing overemployment, which is to a large extent derived
from the fiscal program aimed at producing a 1 percent surplus in 1991;  (b) contraction of
certain activities as a result of the adjustment in relative prices; (c) the privatization process
which would begin by late 1991, likely entailing some technological change and labor shifts.
The  estimates  must  also  account  for  the  impact  of  the  recession  the  economy will
experience during 1991, associated with a terms of trade shock and an expected decline in
real GDP of between 5 and  10 percent.
Estimates presented by  Riveros (1991) differ from those of the Government
in two ways. First, a methodological difference is the projection of quarterly unemployment
flows, as opposed to  the Government's method of projecting an average stock for 1991-
92.  The average estimate of the employment contraction(704 thousand fewer jobs in 1991-
92 in the high unemployment scenario) differs from government projections (944 thousand
fewer jobs are  reported in their likely scenario)  by about 25 percent.  This difference is
principally explained by the fact that  the Government  estimates assume a  much larger13
employment impact of the recession and privatization processes. To the contrary, Riveros'
estimates  imply that  there  will be  much  room  for  significant labor  hoarding.  This
assumption is clearly justified on the grounds. of the recent Polish experience where, due
to significant labor hoarding, there were  a small number of labor dismissals relative to a
sizable output drop (Coricelli and Revenga, 1991).
The second difference is conceptually more important, and refers to the high
optimism of the Government with respect to the prospects for employment creation in the
short  run.  Obviously, the  path  to  recovery of  those  industries contracting due  to  the
recession, and  the  expansion of  other  competitive industries  will take  some  time  in
accordance with investment growth.  Macroeconomic indicators reveal that the  net fixed
investment declined by 12 percent in  1990, and is not likely to significantly increase this
year, making the prospects for massive employment creation rather slim, particularly in the
case of the private sector.  Riveros projects the  creation of about 278 thousand jobs, as
opposed to the  Government estimate of 604 thousand jobs.  The basic assumptions are
that the private  sector (currently employing about  100 thousand persons) will expand 10
percent in 1991 and 20 percent in 1992. In addition, it is assumed that trade and services
will expand by 10 percent during both years, while the financial sector will expand by 30
percent  p.a.  Tourism  is assumed  to  expand by 40  percent  in  1991 and  1992, while
employment in the manufacturing sector is assumed to increase by 5 percent in 1992. The
average unemployment rate projected is 8.5 percent of the labor force, reaching as high as
12 percent during 1992.
An  important  feature  associated  with  those  alternative  unemployment
estimates concerns their fiscal implications. The Government has projected fiscal needs on
the basis of the average unemployment indicated by their likely scenario,about 340 thousand
persons for the period 1991-92,  therefore, contrasting with the about 679 thousand persons
projected by Riveros.  However, the eligibility  criteria for the unemployment compensation
scheme  excludes  those  persons  who  receive  pensions,  currently  about  700  thousand
employees (Table 1A, Appendix).  If the Government is successful  in making the dismissal
of retired  employees a priority, it may well be possible that its budgetary allocations are
consistent with the projections presented here.  For instance, if 60 percent of all retired
persons holding jobs are dismissed,  the average number of unemployed persons eligible for
benefits in  1991-92 reaches 369 thousand persons, which basically corresponds with the
amount allocated by the Government.
IV.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Alike in all other transitional Eastern European countries, an efficient labor
market  is crucial for achieving the  fundamental economic reforms envisaged by CSFR.
Adequate labor market policies during the transition period are important both for making
the adjustment more efficient and in alleviating its direct social impact.  1991 is a critical
year for CSFR's reform process.  Macroeconomic stability must recover soon after price
liberalization  and  setting of new relative  prices.  The  productive sector  must respond
efficiently to the constraints imposed by harsh budgets, especially in a period characterized
by a terms of trade  shock and a major recession.  The privatization process would augur14
well if macroeconomic stability accompanies an institutional framework which is able to
stimulate  investment.  In  this context, development of an  efficient financial market  is
equally  important.  Finally,  the  political  sustainability of  the  program  will  depend
fundamentally upon  evaluation of the observed social cost for 1991. In all these respects,
the short term labor market policies must accomplish a great deal.  Also, insofar as they
provide clear signals indicating the future path of changes in the economy, long term labor
market policies are also important, especially for framing a new institutional environment
with respect to the wage determination process.
The most important challenge in the short run is to control wage increases
in order to avoid creation of an inflationary spiral.  In addition to the restrictive fiscal and
credit policies already implemented, suitable wage indexation is necessary to restrain firms
from using price increases to finance wage adjustments. The wage adjustment mechanisms
implicit in the General Agreement signed in January 1991 must be properly disseminated
among enterprises.  During implementation of the wage policy during 1991, the following
should be kept in mind:
(i)  Enterprises should be permitted to  pay wage increases according to a profit
scheme  so that they may pay bonuses to  their  more productive labor; this
would introduce greater wage differentiation.  In order to accomplish this end,
the traditional tariff-wage system must be eliminated;
(ii)  To achieve the stabilization target, the minimum wage adjustment system must
be  eliminated.  This  also  precludes  attainment  of  more  efficient  labor
allocation,  since otherwise there  will be  further  compression of  the  wage
structure;
(iii)  The private sector should be exempt from wage regulations.  While this is not
crucial for controlling inflation, given the current size of this sector and the
prospects that  large scale privatization will not begin before late  1991, it is
imperative  that  the  privatization  process  be  promoted.  In  general,  the
imposition of  limit wage adjustments for the  wage bill gives incentives to
eliminate overemployment which can be a problem affecting the efficiency of
the  productive sector.  Moreover, as  the  Polish experience indicates, this
problem can be further exacerbated by labor hoarding practices.  Once the
first plane of  the adjustment  is completed and  the  inflationary problem is
under control, the economy may move towards a policy aimed at controlling
the  wage rate which may render benefits in terms of providing productivity
premia  and  set  the  conditions  to  transit  to  a  market-oriented  wage
determination system.
A second important short term policy issue is the need to directly encourage
employment adjustments.  In the cases of both  the non-material sector and  the central
Government, adjustment hinges on the adoption of administrative-cum-privatization  reform
comprehensive of a significant change of both traditional structures and state institutions.
Within firms, this necessitates an attempt  to detach social benefits, particularly housing,
from job provisions. if these reforms are not adopted shortly, employment adjustment will15
be more difficult and incur greater social cost.  Furthermore, in addition to measures
already adopted by the Government to facilitate dismissals,  labor reallocation must be
permitted  within  firms  in order to adjust  the employment  and wage  structure  without  having
to resort to dismissals. These steps require that the internal wage structure be more
flexible,  which in turn necessitates  softening  or eliminating  the tariff-wage  system.
A third important  aspect  of the labor market policy  in the short run is related
to the unemployment  impact of the adjustment.  The Government  has already adopted a
series of policies  regarding  unemployment  benefits  and employment  services.  Government
proje4 .ons,  which have been used to make all necessary  fiscal  allocations,  are consistent
provided that dismissals  concentrate heavily on retired persons.  However, the actual
unemployment rate, independent of the eligibility  criteria for receiving compensation
payments,  will be higher than expected, especially  because  employment  creation will be
slower  than expected. It must be determined  whether society  will be prepared to accept
this fact as a necessary  outcome of the adjustment  process.
As regards longer term policies,  this paper has argued that three areas are
vital for progress:
(i)  Design of the future institutional framework  for the labor market, already
being studied, must be realistic about the future market environment.  In
particular,  in an economy  in which  collective  bargaining  at the firm level will
be the basic means  for determining  wages,  the coordination  and the degree of
centralization are  important  issues, which  connect  with  both  union
organizational  structure and the extent and timing of state intervention. In
addition,  adequate institutional  mechanisms  must be established  for managing
the  minimum wage.  This price must be  used as  a  signal of  economic
developments and of the  basic price for unskilled labor, and not as  an
instrument  of income distribution;
(ii)  Unemployment  will be a feature of the CSFR economy  in the future because
of structural  reasons,  short term skill mismatches,  and the normal fallout  from
the economic cycle.  A scheme integrating Government subsidies and an
insurance system  with participation of both employee  and employer could
initially  be developed;
(iii)  An  adequately designed system for  monitoring the  labor market  is  a
fundamental  tool for policy  making. This system  must include  firm-based  data
which takes into account  firms  regardless  of their property  holdings  and size.
In addition,  the system  must require periodic  labor force surveys.
The crucial  role of the labor market  during  the transition  of CSFR to a market
economy  is twofold. First, the observed  labor market results  will be a paramount factor
concerning  the political  sustainability  of the overall transition. Second,  the efficiency  of
transitional policies in obtaining a rapid supply response depends upon the flexibility
observed in the labor market to produce an adequate labor reallocation.  Tberefore,
adoption of a suitable set of labor market policies and establishment  of an adequate16
sequencing  to minimize  the social cost of the adjustment  and maximize  the effectiveness
of the macroeconomic  policy,  constitc.e the challenge  for the present administrations  in
Eastem Europe. This paper has attempted  to contribute  to the current debate in this area.17
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Czechoslovakia:  Computation  of  the  Total  Population
(awls)
1970  1975  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990*
Total  Population  14334  14802  15311  15356  15369  15414  15458  15499  15534  15573  15608  15639  i670
(100)  (100)  (100)  Cl00)  (100)  (100)  (100)  (100)  1100)  (100)  (100)
working  Age  8158  8483  8709  8710  8696  8700  8713  8734  8765  8784  839  8867  8901 Populatien  11  (56.9)  (57.3)  (56.9)  (56.7)  (56.6)  (56.4)  (56.4)  (56.4)  (56.4)  (56.4)  (56.6)  (56.7)  (56.8)
Eirploywent  6,871  7060  7358  7407  7435  7466  7534  7606  7705  7754  7804  7830  7815
(76.5)  (76.0)  (77.0)  (77.4)  (77.9)  (78.1)  (78.5)  (79.0)  (79.4)  (79.8)  (80.0)  (80.3)  t79.9)
Retired  with  625  610  655  669  669  664  694  705  744  747  736  712  701 Emplow3ent
Students  477  481  521  523  493  462  444  429  430  435  455  n.a.  n.a.
3/  Statistical  Yearbook;  corresponds to  males between  15 and 60 years  old  and female  between  15 and 55 years  otd.  Between brackets,  as  a proportion  of  the  total  population.
*  Exclude  wmn  on maternity  leave,  trainees  and  the  armed  forces.  Includes  double  employment.  See Table  2.  Between brackets,  the  total eaployment,  minus retired  with  employent,  as  a proportion  of  the  working  age  populationTable 2A
Czeckoslovakia:  Corrected Envtoyment
(ool's)
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  t990
Poputation  15356  15369  15414  15458  15499  15534  15573  15608  15639  15670
(100)  (100)  (100)  (100)  (100)  (100)  (C00)  (100)
Working Age Pop.  8710  8696  8700  8713  8734  8765  8784  8839  8867  8901
(56.9)  (56.6)  (56.4)  (56.4)  (56.3)  (56.4)  (56.4)  (56.6)  (56.7)  (56.8)
Corrected Employment  1/  8181  8184  8200  8251  8317  8379  8409  8449  8339  8331
(86.2)  (86.5)  (86.6)  (86.7)  (87.2)  (87.1)  (87.2)  (87.3)  (86.0)  (85.7)
Females  2/  3786  3797  3812  3843  3891  3929  3961  3985  3944  3932
(46.3)  (46.4)  (46.5)  (46.6)  (46.8)  (46.9)  (47.1)  (47.2)  (47.3)  (47.2)
(Uncorrected Employment) /  7407  7435  7466  7534  7606  7705  7754  7804  7830  7815
Under-estimate i  9.5  9.2  8.9  8.7  8.5  8.0  7.8  7.6  6.1  6.2
"Corrected"  employmenit  includes women  on maternity  leave,  trairees,  armed  forces,  and  excludes those with  two or more jobs  in  the  state  secter
/  Between  brackets,  as proportions  of  the  working age population.  See note  in  Table 1.
gf  Between  brackets,  as proportions  of  the  total  employment.
F/  From  Table 1.
!±  As a proportion  of  corrected  employment  figures.20
Table  3A
Stmt  ol M2mDlvmnt
12m  121  12i  1A
Total  100  100  100  100  100
State  88.8  89.1  88.9  88.8  88.7
Cooperatives  10.9  10.7  10.6  10.6  10.6
(of  which
Agricultural)  (18.5)  (8.3)  (8.2)  (8.3)  (8.3)
Self-Employed  0.3  0.3  0.6  0.6  0.7
(of  which
farmers)  (0.2)  (0.1)  (0.1)  (0.1)  (0.0)
Table  4A
EMplyment'  by  Training
(percent)
1260  1963  1270  1.97  1978  1983  1289
University  3.3  3.5  4.5  5.1  6.2  7.8  8.8
Secondary  School  15.6  17.1  19.9  21.0  22.5  25.9  27.1
School  for  --  35.7  38.1
Apprentices
Primary  School  --  --  --  --  --  30.6  26.0
1  Civilian  employment  excluding  the  private  sector.Table 5A
Czechoslovakia: Totat  Civilian  EDlowent  by I  nustrv t 194t-1988
(Amual  Averages; 0008S)
Item  1961  1982  1923  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
Total  7815  7822  7837  7887  7953  8011  8039  8078  8075
(100)  (100)  (100)  (100)  (100)  (100)  (100)  (100)  (1CO)
1.  Agriculture,  hunting,  1031  1020  999  1002  1003  996  987  975  948
forestry  and fishins  (13.2)  (53.0)  (12.7)  (12.7)  (12.6)  (12.4)  (12.1)  (12.1)  (11.7)
2.  Nining  ard quarrying  209  214  217  223  225  226  227  229  229
(2.6)  (2.7)  (2.8)  (2.9)  (2.8)  (2.8)  (2.8)  (2.8)  (2.8)
3.  Manufacturfng  2735  2737  2740  2741  2754  2769  2778  2782  2776
(35.0)  (35.0)  (35.0)  (35.0)  (34.8)  (34.6)  (34.6)  (34.4)  (34.4)
4.  Etectricity,  gas  106  107  111  113  111  113  113  115  117
and water  (1.4)  (1.4)  (1.4)  (1.4)  (1.4)  (1.4)  (1.4)  (1.4)  (1.4)
5.  Construction  667  658  659  663  667  678  685  689  684
(8.5)  (8.4)  (8.4)  (8.4)  (8.4)  (8.5)  (8.5)  (8.5)  (8.5)
6.  WHolesale and retail  901  905  919  923  936  935  942  947  955
trade,  restaurants  (11.5)  (11.6)  (11.7)  11.7)  (11.8)  (11.7)  11.7)  (11.7)  (11.8)
and hotels
7.  TrI  ort,  storage  514  512  510  513  514  518  S20  519  523
anm  cinication  (6.6)  (6.5)  (6.5)  (6.5)  (6.5)  (6.5)  (6.5)  (6.4)  (6.5)
8.  Financig,  ins  e  257  261  265  269  275  287  285  290  291
real  estate,  business  (3.3)  (3.3)  (3.4)  (3.4)  (3.5)  (3.6)  (3.5)  (3.6)  (3.6)
services
9.  Coimity,  social  and  1374  1387  1397  1420  1448  1466  1480  1510  1530
personal services  (17.6)  (17.7)  (17.8)  (18.0)  (18.2)  (18.3)  (18.4)  (18.7)  (18.9)
10.  Activitiesnot  21  21  20  20  2D  23  22  22  22
adeqaately defined  (0.3)  (0.3)  (0.3)  (0.3)  (0.3)  (0.3)  (0.3)  (0.3)  (0.3)
1  ISIC-68 mjor  divisions
Brackets give  item as a percentage of  the  total.Tabte  6A
Index  of  Averan  Monthly  lmes. ad  Earnfnqs
Average Growth  Rate CX)
197D  1975  1960  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  70-89  70-80  80-89  89-90
RestlWane
Total  Wage  100  118  124  125  125  128  130  133  128  1.5  2.2  0.7  -3.8
1.  Nateriel  Sphere  100  116  125  127  128  131  134  138  133  1.5  2.2  1.0  -3.6
- Agricutture  100  122  130  139  139  143  146  152  152  2.2  2.7  1.8  --
- Iniistry  100  118  126  130  131  134  137  139  135  1.6  2.3  1.1  -2.9
- Construction  100  117  122  124  125  128  131  133  130  1.4  2.0  0.9  -2.3
2.  Ion-Materiet  Sphere  100  118  122  119  119  122  126  127  123  1.3  2.0  0.4  -3.2
^  preliminary
Souce:  Statistifda  RocenkTable TA
Reolstive Hi
(Average Naterfal  Sector  100)
1970  1975  1980  1985  1986  1987  1968  1989  1990
Agriculture  92  95  96  99  99  99  100  101  103
Industry  101  100  101  103  103  102  102  102  102
Construction  110  110  108  108  108  109  108  109  109
Von-Material  95  96  93  90  90  90  90  90  90
*  Includes  Eiccaticn  and Health24
Table  8A
A_rage  Monthly  WAgen  of  Workers  by Oalification
(classified  by  sectors)
(in  June  1088)
out  of  which  eduation  level
Branch  Total  primary appren-  secondary  higher
ticeship  (underversity)
in  Kcs
Total  workers  3196  2660  3275  3273  4213
From  the  total:
agriculturel  3162  2882  3320  3214  4075
industry  3265  2706  3413  3450  4439
o.w.:  mining  4689  3833  4924  4915  6180
metallurgie  3741  3069  3858  3969  5137
chemistry  3512  2921  3552  3695  4488
machinery  3225  2569  3341  3308  4155
electrotechnics  3064  2456  3118  3181  4033
textile  2704  2579  2765  3073  4129
food  2811  2390  2946  3150  4249
construction  3444  3004  3523  3490  4426
transport  3317  3173  3300  3510  4125
commerce  2667  2156  2600  3019  4282
education  3037  --  2234  2708  3910
health  2879  2055  2569  2749  3959
1 excluding  agricultural  cooperatives
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